Current Strategic prospects in the High North
Geostrategic Permanence: Iceland in the Second World War/Cold War and the new High North
Current Strategic prospects in the High North
Geostrategic Permanence: Iceland in the Second World War/Cold War and the new High North
RUSI Seminar
London 27.02.24
Mr. President
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The High North has evolved from a region of marginal interest to a strategic nexus, reflecting shifting priorities within NATO and the US.
At the time when the US turned its focus from Europe to the Middle East and NATO was engaged in out of area operations, the closure of the US Naval base in Keflavik in 2006 should not have come as a surprise.
The Russians had become our allies, they might even join NATO and in any case their fleet was rusting down on the Kola Peninsula. The main worry was what to do with the nuclear waste.
However, on the very day of the U.S. withdrawal—September 30, 2006—Russian military activity near Iceland began to stir, with unannounced approaches by Russian aircraft, challenging the safety of commercial air traffic and raising tensions with the Icelandic government.
The Icelandic Prime Minister's grievance, aired at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008—attended by none other than President Vladimir Putin—highlighted the perils posed by Russia's unannounced military flights to commercial aviation in Icelandic airspace. This logical concern was met with an insolent rebuff weeks later when the Russian Ambassador to Reykjavik confronted Ambassador Sigurjónsson, who is among us here today – at the time foreign policy advisor to the PM.
Instructed by Moscow, the Russian Ambassador criticized the Icelandic Prime Minister's candour as a breach of diplomatic protocol in Putin's presence. Yet, when Iceland's right to secure its airspace was asserted, the Ambassador retorted by relegating the issue to being a U.S.-Russia bilateral concern, effectively side-lining Iceland's sovereignty.
This encounter underscores the complex interplay between national security and international diplomacy—a theme that resonates with our present geopolitical climate in the High North.
The narrative also sets the stage for the current trends in the High North. On the one hand we have the dominating U.S.-Russia dynamics with an ever-watchful Chinese presence in the backdrop. On the other we see smaller states taking fast and courageous decisions that have a water shedding geopolitical impact for years to come with Sweden and Finland entering NATO.
In fact, Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine has catapulted the Nordic states towards much deeper co-ordination and cooperation in the field of security and defence. For the first time since 1523(!).
Regarding Iceland, we have had a full-fledged bilateral defence agreement with the United States since 1951. The other four Nordics have much more recently made bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreements giving the US Armed Forces access to some 50 bases in the five Nordic countries.
In response to these strategic changes, Iceland, despite having no military, has under the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs become a host nation for NATO and Allied visiting forces when operating out of Iceland.
The Icelandic Coast Guard is responsible for the daily running of a secure NATO zone at Keflavik Airport and of the NATO radar and control systems there.
Since 2008 NATO allies have protected Iceland's airspace with 11 NATO air forces contributing to almost 50 patrol periods. The most frequent are from the US, Norway, and Italy.
Until now it has not been considered necessary to station US forces again on a permanent basis at Keflavik to defend Iceland and the waters around the island.
The secure zone is being upgraded to accommodate more personnel and advanced military technology.
The base's location near the strategically important GIUK Gap makes it crucial for NATO surveillance operations.
Rotating aircraft from multiple allied countries contribute to joint efforts in the region.
Allow me to draw your attention to several significant examples, focusing on the naval and air domains surrounding Iceland as they provide insights into the evolving geopolitical landscape in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea.
In April 2023, US Navy nuclear-powered submarines received authorization for the first time to make service visits to Iceland for resupply and crew exchange. This marks a significant shift and highlights the growing importance of the region for US submarine operations.
Secure communication and data transfer through undersea cables are vital for transatlantic communications and reinforcements. Recognizing this, representatives from Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) nations and partners met in Keflavik in June 2023 to discuss strategies for detecting, deterring, and responding to threats against this crucial infrastructure.
In 2018, the Trident Juncture NATO exercise commenced in Iceland, involving allied naval vessels and a carrier task force led by USS Harry S. Truman – the first such visit to the High North in 30 years. This exercise demonstrated NATO's commitment to regional security and its ability to project power in the Arctic.
April 2022 saw the inaugural visit of the British aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales to Reykjavík. This visit, coupled with its subsequent unique stop at the remote Norwegian meteorological station on Jan Mayen, underscored the growing role of the Royal Navy in the High North.
Keflavik serves as a regular base for the US Air Force Bomber Task Force with B-2 stealth bombers. Last year, this task force conducted its first low-approach flight over Greenland and integrated with the Icelandic Coast Guard and British, Norwegian, and Portuguese air forces, securing a vast area of Europe.
In recent years US bombers have conducted regular joint exercises with Swedish, Finnish, and Norwegian air forces. This collaboration signifies a coordinated effort to enhance security beyond the Arctic Circle.
The recent announcement by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden to establish a "Unified Nordic Air Force" is a remarkable development. This initiative, centralizing command of around 250 combat aircraft, indicates a strengthened Nordic defence posture and collective approach to security.
This emphasis on an integrated air force stretching from North America to the Kola Peninsula and the Baltic represents the strategic axis that seamlessly connects the North Atlantic and the Baltic by air and sea.
This unfolding narrative in the North Atlantic and High North aligns with NATO's summit declarations since 2016, reflecting a firm commitment to countering Russia's Arctic military expansion.
Therefore, in 2018, NATO strategically re-established its presence in the North Atlantic through the Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia. This critical move symbolized NATO's adaptation to the shifting geopolitical landscape.
The Norfolk command operates under a dual-hatted leadership with the US 2nd Fleet – which had been disbanded in 2011 after 65 years of service and re-established in 2018. Both entities now share a singular focus: deterrence and multi-domain protection of the Arctic, the transatlantic link, and the approaches to Europe.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identified Russia's potential to disrupt Allied reinforcements and North Atlantic navigation as a fundamental challenge.
Last summer's Vilnius summit reaffirmed NATO's unwavering commitment to measured, coordinated actions, including the approval of relevant defence plans.
The fortitude of these plans for the North Atlantic and High North is currently being tested in the largest NATO exercise in four decades – Steadfast Defender 2024.
It is noteworthy that Steadfast Defender's initial phase involves a large-scale, secure troop transfer from North America to Norwegian harbours north of Iceland.
Operating in the Norwegian Sea, the British aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales will spearhead a strike group of eight ships from various nations, including the US, Spain, and Denmark.
An impressive, allied fleet of 40 vessels, representing over two dozen countries, will participate in the maritime portion of Steadfast Defender, scheduled for Norway's Arctic coast in March.
Additionally, landing crafts and marines will execute amphibious operations on the Norwegian coastline.
Steadfast Defender's land component, Nordic Response, is a significant exercise which engages over 20,000 soldiers from 13 nations, weaving a tapestry of military cooperation across Norway, Finland, and Sweden, particularly in the strategically crucial "Cap of the North."
The exercise scenario itself is built on a hypothetical activation of NATO’s Article 5, simulating a multinational response to an attack by a neighbouring military power.
While Russian reactions to the exercises are still to be seen, certain developments on their side are worth considering.
Professor Katarzyna Zysk of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies paints a nuanced picture. While acknowledging the depletion of Russian land forces due to the Ukraine conflict, she emphasizes the continued activity of its air and naval forces in the High North. Despite redirecting 80% of land forces to Ukraine, resulting in personnel and equipment losses, Russia's Northern Fleet remains largely intact.
This robust naval and air presence guarantees the protection of strategic nuclear submarines, the cornerstone of Russia's nuclear deterrence and second-strike capability. With a formidable arsenal of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft, the Northern Fleet represents a multi-domain threat further bolstered by ongoing modernization efforts.
Professor Zysk highlights investments in underwater drones and nuclear-powered cruise missiles, indicating Russia's strategic intent to not only recover from current setbacks but also to forge ahead in the Arctic.
Beyond allied exercises it is worth mentioning that Denmark recently earmarked 400 million dollars towards strengthening its Arctic and North Atlantic surveillance and intelligence capabilities. This move, as outlined by the Danish Defence Minister, signifies an expanded security role for the Danish Kingdom, encompassing Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland.
In short, there is a concerted effort by NATO and its allies to safeguard the High North in the face of evolving capabilities and intent of Russia. The future of the Arctic security architecture remains to be written, but these developments are shaping its narrative.
As for the three defenceless North Atlantic islands, the Faroe Isles, Greenland, and Iceland one may ask if this trend does not require new measures for their security.
Ladies and gentlemen.
Russia has become increasingly assertive over its territory and waterways in the Arctic and has suspended financing the Arctic Council. Coupled with increased military activities it seems unrealistic to describe the Arctic as a low-tension area.
In 2019 I was commissioned by the Nordic Foreign Ministers to make some proposals on issues of expanding concern: cyber and hybrid threats, climate change, and the eroding rules-based international order.
My study laid bare the harsh reality: climate change, coupled with escalating international tensions, fuelled big power rivalry in the Arctic between the US, Russia, and China. At the time Chinese military activity in the High North remained minimal.
However, April 2023 saw a decisive shift with a Russia-China memorandum signed in Murmansk. This agreement, endorsed by top leaders of Russian FSB Border Guards and the Chinese Coast Guard, outlined joint efforts to combat terrorism, migration, and illegal activities, paving the way for increased Chinese involvement in the Arctic.
In my report I cautioned against replicating the situation in the South China Sea, where China's expansive maritime claims undermine international law, despite China having ratified the UN Law of the Sea Convention. Such tactics must be kept out of the Arctic.
Today, it is crucial to acknowledge the evolving power dynamic between Russia and China. Russia's new junior partnership role is unlikely to change, implying that this new authoritarian alliance shapes the Arctic's future orientation.
While a unified Nordic policy toward China remains elusive, formulating one demands considering the evolving US role in the Pacific. Could this potentially contradict the strong Nordic-US ties?
In my view, the importance of the transatlantic Nordic connection will continue to grow with collaborative defence strategies refined under NATO's Norfolk Command.
The North Atlantic, long recognized as a vital shield for North America, transcends short-term political shifts. Regardless of U.S. presidential administrations, its strategic importance remains unwavering. Steadfast Defender 2024, with its expansive reach beyond the Arctic Circle, exemplifies this ongoing commitment.
My 2020 Nordic report highlighted the potential for Iceland to leverage the growing Nordic security cooperation in NORDEFCO, the Nordic defence mechanism, as a third pillar of its security strategy. This is especially relevant given Iceland's current partnership status in all NORDEFCO activities.
The recent induction of all Nordic nations into NATO signifies a historic moment and a historic opportunity. As the leader of the Icelandic parliamentary delegation to the Nordic Council aptly noted, Iceland has an opportunity to elevate its participation in this growing military cooperation – without establishing its own armed forces.
Redefining our Coast Guard's capabilities and safeguarding undersea cables are crucial steps for Iceland. Moreover, our role as a host nation for rotating allied forces will assume increasing importance.
The UK's historic presence in securing the North Atlantic remains essential. There are close operational links between Keflavik and Lossiemouth in Scotland.
As Iceland hosted a Council of Europe summit last spring RAF guaranteed air policing over and around Iceland by special agreement.
The UK has taken a leading role in the Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe. As a highly valued ally it has also trained regularly with its NATO and Nordic allies to maintain capabilities in the High North and on the North Atlantic which is regarded as UK ‘s „home beat“.
Iceland thinks of the North Atlantic as a shared domain, entrusted to the US and UK, and desires to be regarded as a dependable partner in ensuring its security.
Ladies and gentlemen!
The High North serves as a barometer for the shifting geopolitical landscape, where global powers converge, and the future of international cooperation hangs in the balance.
As we navigate these strategic waters, unwavering dedication to shared values, peace, stability, and vigilance is paramount. Once a periphery, the High North now demands our collective focus and strategic awareness.